Vendor: Quietfail Apps Last updated: 23 August 2026
This app runs entirely on Atlassian's Forge platform. No customer data leaves Atlassian's infrastructure. There are no vendor servers, no third-party services, no analytics, and no data transfer to the vendor. The vendor has no access path to your data.
The app is certified under Atlassian's Runs on Atlassian program, which requires that an app store data exclusively on Atlassian infrastructure and perform no data egress.
The app reads ownership and permission metadata only. It builds a map of what a person owns or administers, so that an administrator can see what would break if that person were deactivated.
| The app reads | The app never reads |
|---|---|
| Project name, key, and project lead | Issue summaries, descriptions, or comments |
| Project role membership | Attachments of any kind |
| Filter and dashboard ownership | Confluence page bodies |
| Confluence space names and space administrators | Email addresses |
| Confluence page titles, authors, and edit restrictions | Personal profile fields |
Every call the app makes is a read. The app never writes to Jira or Confluence.
All data is stored in the Forge storage APIs of your own Atlassian site — the Custom Entity Store and the Key-Value Store. That storage belongs to your installation. It is not shared between customers, and the vendor cannot query it.
Uninstalling the app removes its stored data along with the installation.
The app stores Atlassian account IDs, and caches display names for the duration of a scan so that results are readable. It participates in Atlassian's Personal Data Reporting programme: a scheduled job reports the account IDs the app holds to the platform every day and acts on what the platform returns — erasing the data of accounts that have been closed, and dropping cached display names for accounts whose details have changed.
The app never stores or transmits email addresses.
The app's only user interface is a Jira administration page. Before any data is returned, the app verifies the caller's permissions through Atlassian's permissions REST APIs:
ADMINISTER permission, checked throughPOST /rest/api/3/permissions/check.
checked through the Confluence content permissions API. A caller who cannot see a space does not see findings about it, and the screen states how many rows were hidden.
Both checks fail closed: if a check cannot be completed, access is denied rather than granted.
Please report security issues through either channel:
Please include steps to reproduce. We will acknowledge the report, classify its severity by CVSS, and fix it within the timeframes of the Atlassian Marketplace Security Bug Fix Policy, which is the governing policy — not a timeframe invented here. Where a fix affects customers, we notify Atlassian and affected customers using Atlassian's notification process.
Please do not disclose a vulnerability publicly before we have had a chance to fix it.
Dependencies are checked with npm audit each development round. Where a vulnerable path is not reachable by this app, we record that assessment rather than claim a fix. Where a fix does not break the interface, we take it.
Stated deliberately, because a security policy that promises more than the operation delivers is worse than a modest one:
retention Atlassian provides.
HIPAA certification.
What is committed to is a response time to a report, and adherence to Atlassian's bug fix policy — not continuous availability.
This policy is reviewed annually, alongside the Marketplace security questionnaire, and out of cycle after any real incident.